Statically Detecting Vulnerabilities by Processing Programming Languages
  as Natural Languages by Medeiros, Ibéria et al.
1Statically Detecting Vulnerabilities by Processing Programming
Languages as Natural Languages
IBE´RIA MEDEIROS, LASIGE, Faculdade de Cieˆncias, Universidade de Lisboa - Portugal
NUNO NEVES, LASIGE, Faculdade de Cieˆncias, Universidade de Lisboa - Portugal
MIGUEL CORREIA, INESC-ID, Instituto Superior Te´cnico, Universidade de Lisboa - Portugal
Web applications continue to be a favorite target for hackers due to a combination of wide adoption and
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DEKANT tool and evaluated experimentally with a large set of PHP applications and WordPress plugins.
Overall, we found several hundred vulnerabilities belonging to 12 classes of input validation vulnerabilities,
where 62 of them were zero-day.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Web applications are being used to implement interfaces of a myriad of services. ey are oen
the rst target of aacks, and despite considerable eorts to improve security, there are still
many examples of high impact compromises. In the 2017 OWASP Top 10 list, vulnerabilities like
SQL injection (SQLI) and cross-site scripting (XSS) continue to raise signicant concerns, but
other classes are also listed as being commonly exploited [39]. Millions of websites have been
compromised since Oct. 2014 due to vulnerabilities in plugins of Drupal [4] and WordPress [35, 36],
and the data of more than a billion users has been stolen using SQLI aacks against various kinds
of services (governmental, nancial, education, mail, etc) [10, 34]. In addition, the next wave of
XSS aacks has been predicted for the past two years, with an important expected growth of the
problem [11, 31].
Many of these vulnerabilities are related to malformed inputs that reach some relevant asset (e.g.,
the database or the user’s browser) by traveling through a code slice (a series of instructions) of the
web application. erefore, a good practice to enhance security is to pass inputs through sanitization
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functions that invalidate dangerous metacharacters or/and validation functions that check their
content. In addition, programmers commonly use static analysis tools to search automatically
for bugs in the source code, facilitating their removal. e development of these tools, however,
requires coding explicitly the knowledge on how each vulnerability can be detected [6, 9, 12, 17],
which is a complex task. Moreover, this knowledge might be incomplete or partially wrong, making
the tools inaccurate [7]. For example, if the tools do not understand that a certain function sanitizes
inputs, they could raise an alert about a vulnerability that does not exist.
is paper presents a new approach for static analysis that is based on learning to recognize
vulnerabilities. It leverages from articial intelligence (AI) concepts, more precisely from classica-
tion models for sequences of observations that are commonly used in the eld of natural language
processing (NLP). NLP is a conuence of AI and linguistics, which involves intelligent analysis of
wrien language, i.e., the natural languages. In this sense, NLP is considered a sub-area of AI. It
can be viewed as a new form of intelligence in an articial way that can get insights how humans
understand natural languages. NLP tasks, such as parts-of-speech (PoS) tagging or named entity
recognition (NER), are typically modelled as sequence classication problems, in which a class
(e.g., a given morpho-syntactic category) is assigned to each word in a given sentence, according
to estimate given by a structured prediction model that takes word order into consideration. e
model’s parameters are normally inferred using supervised machine learning techniques, taking
advantage of annotated corpora.
We propose applying a similar approach to web programming languages, i.e., to analyse source
code in a similar manner to what is being done with natural language text. Even though, these
languages are articial, they have many characteristics in common with natural languages, such
as words, syntactic rules, sentences, and a grammar. NLP usually employs machine learning to
extract rules (knowledge) automatically from a corpus. en, with this knowledge, other sequences
of observations can be processed and classied. NLP has to take into account the order of the
observations, as the meaning of sentences depends on it. erefore NLP involves forms of classi-
cation more sophisticated than approaches based on standard classiers (e.g., naive Bayes, decision
trees, support vector machines), which simply check the presence of certain observations without
considering any relation between them.
Our approach for static analysis resorts to machine language techniques that take the order
of source code instructions into account – sequence models – to allow accurate detection and
identication of the vulnerabilities in the code. Previous applications of machine learning in
the context of static analysis neither produced tools that learn to make detection nor employed
sequence models. For example, PhpMinerII resorts to machine learning to train standard classiers,
which then verify if certain constructs (associated with aws) exist in the code. However, it does
not provide the exact location of the vulnerabilities [28, 29]. WAP and WAPe use a taint analyser
to search for vulnerabilities and a standard classier to conrm that the found bugs1 can actually
create security problems [17]. None of these tools considers the order of code elements or the
relation among them, leading to bugs being missed (false negatives, FN ) and alarms being raised on
correct code (false positives, FP).
Our sequence model is a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [23]. A HMM is a Bayesian network
composed of nodes corresponding to the states and edges associated to the probabilities of transi-
tioning between states. States are hidden, i.e., are not observed. Given a sequence of observations,
the hidden states (one per observation) are discovered following the model and taking into account
the order of the observations. erefore, the HMM can be used to nd the series of states that best
explains the sequence of observations.
1In soware security context, we consider vulnerability as a being a bug or a aw that can be exploitable.
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e paper also presents the hidDEn marKov model diAgNosing vulnerabiliTies (DEKANT) tool that
implements our approach for applications wrien in PHP. e tool was evaluated experimentally
with a diverse set of 23 open source web applications with bugs disclosed in the past. ese
applications are substantial, with an aggregated size of around 8,000 les and 2.5 million lines of
code (LoC). All aws that we are aware of being previously reported were found by DEKANT. More
than one thousand slices were analyzed, 714 were classied as having vulnerabilities and 305 as
not. e false positives were in the order of two dozens. In addition, the tool checked 23 plugins of
WordPress and found 62 zero-day vulnerabilities. ese aws were reported to the developers, and
some of them already conrmed their existence and xed the plugins. DEKANT was also assessed
with several other vulnerability detection tools, and the results give evidence that our approach
leads to beer accuracy and precision.
e main contributions of the paper are: (1) a novel approach for improving the security of web
applications by leing static analysis tools learn to discover vulnerabilities through an annotated
corpus; (2) an intermediate language representation capturing the relevant features of PHP, and a
sequence model that takes into consideration the place where code elements appear in the slices
and how they alter the spreading of the input data; (3) a static analysis tool that implements the
approach; (4) an experimental evaluation that demonstrates the ability of this tool to nd known
and zero-day vulnerabilities with a residual number of mistakes.
2 RELATEDWORK
Static analysis tools search for vulnerabilities in the applications usually by processing the source
code (e.g., [2, 6, 9, 12, 17, 27, 33]). Many of these tools perform taint analysis, tracking user inputs
to determine if they reach a sensitive sink (i.e., a function that could be exploited). Pixy [12] was
one of the rst tools to automate this kind of analysis on PHP applications. Later on, RIPS [6]
extended this technique with the ability to process more advanced constructs of PHP (e.g., objects).
phpSAFE [9] is a recent solution that does taint analysis to look for aws in CMS plugins (e.g.,
WordPress plugins). WAP [17, 18] also does taint analysis, but aims at reducing the number of
false positives by resorting to data mining, besides also correcting automatically the located bugs.
Other works [42, 43] detect vulnerabilities by processing source code properties represented as
graphs. In this paper, we propose an novel approach which, unlike these works, does not involve
programming information about bugs, but instead extracts this knowledge from annotated code
samples and thus learns to nd the vulnerabilities.
Machine learning has been used in a few works to measure the quality of soware by collecting
a series of aributes that reveal the presence of soware defects [1, 14]. Other approaches resort to
machine learning to predict if there are vulnerabilities in a program [19, 22, 38], which is dierent
from identifying precisely the bugs, something that we do in this paper. To support the predictions
they employ various features, such as past vulnerabilities and function calls [19], or a combination
of code-metric analysis with metadata gathered from application repositories [22]. In particular,
PhpMinerI and PhpMinerII predict the presence of vulnerabilities in PHP programs [28–30]. e
tools are rst trained with a set of annotated slices that end at a sensitive sink (but do not necessarily
start at an entry point), and then they are ready to identify slices with errors. WAP and WAPe are
dierent because they use machine learning and data mining to predict if a vulnerability detected
by taint analysis is actually a real bug or a false alarm [17, 18]. In any case, PhpMiner and WAP
tools employ standard classiers (e.g., Logistic Regression or a Multi-Layer Perceptron) instead of
structured prediction models (i.e., a sequence classier) as we propose here.
ere are a few static analysis tools that implement machine learning techniques. Chucky [44]
discovers vulnerabilities by identifying missing checks in C language soware. VulDeePecker [15]
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resorts to code gadgets to represent parts of C programs and then transforms them into vectors. A
neural network system then determines if the target program is vulnerable due to buer or resource
management errors. Russell et al. [25] developed a vulnerability detection tool for C and C++ based
on features learning from a dataset and articial neural network. Scandariato et al. [26] performs
text mining to predict vulnerable soware components in Android applications. SuSi [24] employs
machine learning to classify sources and sinks in the code of Android API.
is paper extends our previous work [16]. Our approach extracts PHP slices, but contrary to the
others it translates them into a tokenized language to be processed by a HMM. While tools in the
literature collect aributes from a slice and classify them without considering ordering relations
among statements, which is simplistic, DEKANT also does classication but takes into account
the place in which code elements appear in the slice. Such form of classication assists on a more
accurate and precise detection of bugs.
3 SURFACE VULNERABILITIES
Many classes of security aws in web applications are caused by improper handling of user inputs.
erefore, they are denominated surface vulnerabilities or input validation vulnerabilities. In PHP
programs the malicious input arrives to the application (e.g, $ POST ), then it may suer various
modications and might be copied to variables, and eventually reaches a security-sensitive function
(e.g., mysqli query or echo) inducing an erroneous action. Below, we introduce the 12 classes of
surface vulnerabilities that will be considered in rest of the paper.
SQLI is the class of vulnerabilities with highest risk in the OWASP Top 10 list [39]. Normally, the
malicious input is used to change the behavior of a query to a database to provoke the disclosure
of private data or corrupt the tables.
Example 3.1. e PHP script of Fig. 1 (a) has a simple SQLI vulnerability. $u receives the username
provided by the user (line 1), and then it is inserted in a query (lines 2-3). An aacker can inject
a malicious username like ’ OR 1 = 1 - - , modifying the structure of the query and geing the
passwords of all users.
XSS vulnerabilities allow aackers to execute scripts in the users’ browsers. Below we give an
example:
Example 3.2. e code snippet of Fig. 2 (a) has a XSS vulnerability. If the user provides a name,
it gets saved in $u (line 1). en, if conditional validation is false (line 3), the value is returned to
the user by echo (line 6). A script provided as input would be executed in the browser, possibly
carrying out some malicious deed.
PHP code slice-isl variable map tainted list slice-isl classification
1 $u = $ POST[‘username’]; input var 1 - u TL = {u} 〈input,Taint〉 〈var vv u,Taint〉
2 $q = "SELECT pass FROM users WHERE user=’".$u."’"; var var 1 u q TL = {u, q} 〈var vv u,Taint〉 〈var vv q,Taint〉
3 $r = mysqli query($con, $q); ss var var 1 - q r TL = {u, q, r} 〈ss,N-Taint〉 〈var vv q,Taint〉 〈var vv r,Taint〉
(a) code with SQLI vulnerability (b) slice-isl (c) outpuing the nal classication
Fig. 1. Code vulnerable to SQLI, translation into ISL, and detection of the vulnerability.
PHP code slice-isl variable map list
1 $u = (isset($ POST[‘name’]) ? $u = $ POST[‘name’] : ’’; input var 1 - u TL = {u}; CTL = {}
2 $a = $ POST[‘age’]; input var 1 - a TL = {u, a}; CTL = {}
3 if (isset($a) && preg match(’/[a-zA-Z]+/’, $u) && cond fillchk var contentchk var 0 - - a - u - a - TL = {u, a}; CTL = {u, a}
is int($a)) typechk var cond
4 echo ’<input type="hidden" name="user" value="’.$u.’">’; cond ss var 0 - - u TL = {u, a}; CTL = {u, a}
5 else cond 0 - TL = {u, a}; CTL = {}
6 echo $u . "is an invalid user"; ss var 0 - u TL = {u, a}; CTL = {}
(a) code with XSS vulnerability and validation (b) slice-isl and variable map (c) artefacts lists
Fig. 2. Code with a slice vulnerable to XSS (lines {1, 3, 5, 6}) and a slice not vulnerable (lines {1, 2, 3, 4}),
with ISL translation.
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e other classes are presented briey. Remote and local le inclusion (RFI/LFI) aws also allow
aackers to insert code in the vulnerable web application. While in RFI the code can be located in
another web site, in LFI it has to be in the local le system (but there are also several strategies to
put it there). OS command injection (OSCI) lets an aacker to provide commands to be run in a
shell of the OS of the web server. Aackers can supply code that is executed by a eval function by
exploring PHP command injection (PHPCI) bugs. LDAP injection (LDAPI), like SQLI, is associated
to the construction and execution of queries, in this case for the LDAP service. An aacker can read
les from the local le system by exploiting directory traversal / path traversal (DT/PT) and source
code disclosure (SCD) vulnerabilities. A comment spamming (CS) bug is related to the ranking
manipulation of spammers’ web sites. Header injection or HTTP response spliing (HI) allows an
aacker to manipulate the HTTP response. An aacker can force a web client to use a session ID
he dened by exploiting a session xation (SF) aw.
4 OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH
Our approach for vulnerability detection examines program slices to determine if they contain a bug.
e slices are collected from the source code of the target application, and then their instructions
are represented in an intermediate language developed to express features that are relevant to
surface vulnerabilities. Bugs are found by classifying the translated instructions with an HMM
sequence model. Since the model has an understanding of how the data ows are aected by
operations related to sanitization, validation and modication, it becomes feasible to make an
accurate analysis. In order to setup the model, there is a learning phase where an annotated corpus
is employed to derive the knowledge about the dierent classes of vulnerabilities. Aerwards, the
model is used to detect vulnerabilities. Fig. 3 illustrates this procedure.
In more detail, the following steps are carried out. e learning phase is composed mainly of
steps (1)-(3) while the detection phase encompasses (1) and (4):
(1) Slice collection and translation: get the slices from the application source code (either for
learning or detection). Since we are focusing on surface vulnerabilities, the only slices that have to
be considered need to start at some point in the program where an user input is received (i.e., at an
entry point) and then they have to end at a security-sensitive instruction (i.e., a sensitive sink). e
resulting slice is a series of tracked instructions between the two points. en, each instruction
of a slice is represented into the Intermediate Slice Language (ISL) (Section 5). ISL is a categorized
Gather Slices
Source Code 
for Training
Target 
Source Code
ISL 
Representation
Instructions     
in ISL
Slice Collection & Translation
Annotate with 
Model States
Duplicate 
Elimination
Corpus
Create the 
Corpus
Computation of 
Parameters
Trained Model
Knowledge 
Extraction
Decode Model 
States
Vulnerabilities 
Detected
Search for 
Vulnerabilities
Entry points 
Sensitive sinks
(a) Learning phase (b) Detection phase
Fig. 3. Overview on the proposed approach.
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language with grammar rules that aggregate in classes the code elements by functionality. A slice
in the ISL format is going to be named as slice-isl;
(2) Create the corpus: build a corpus with a group of instructions represented in the intermediate
language, which are labeled either as vulnerable or non-vulnerable. e instructions are provided
individually or gathered from slices of training programs. Overall, the corpus includes both
representative pieces of programs that have various kinds of aws and that handle inputs adequately;
(3) Knowledge extraction: acquire knowledge from the corpus to congure the HMM sequence
model, namely compute the probability matrices;
(4) Search for Vulnerabilities: use the model to nd the best sequence of states that explains
a slice in the intermediate language. Each instruction in the slice corresponds to a sequence of
observations. ese observations are classied by the model, tracking the variables from the
previous instructions to nd out which emission probabilities are selected. e state computed for
the last observation of the last instruction determines the overall classication, either as vulnerable
or not. If a aw is found, an alert is reported including the location in the source code.
e next two sections explain the ISL language and the sequence model (Section 5 and 6). en,
the four above steps are elaborated in Section 7. An overview of the tool that implements our
approach is given in Section 8.
5 INTERMEDIATE SLICE LANGUAGE
All slices commence with an entry point and nish with a sensitive sink; between them there
can be an arbitrary number of statements, such as assignments that transmit data to intermediate
variables and various kinds of expressions that validate or modify the data. In other words, a slice
contains all instructions (lines of code) that manipulate and propagate an input arriving at an entry
point and until a sensitive sink is reached, but no other statements.
ISL expresses an instruction into a few tokens. e instructions are composed of code elements
that are categorized in classes of related items (e.g., class input takes PHP entry points like $ GET
and $ POST). erefore, classes are the tokens of the ISL language and these are organized together
accordingly to a grammar. Next we give a more careful explanation of ISL assuming that the source
code is programmed in the PHP language. However, the approach is generic and other languages
could be considered.
5.1 Tokens
ISL abstracts away aspects of the PHP language that are irrelevant to the discovery of surface
vulnerabilities. erefore, as a starting point to specify ISL, it was necessary to identify the essential
tokens. To achieve this, we followed an iterative approach where we began with an initial group of
tokens which were gradually rened. In every iteration, we examined various slices (vulnerable and
not) to recognize the important code elements. We also looked at the PHP instructions that could
manipulate entry points and be associated to bugs or prevent them (e.g., functions that replace
characters in strings). In addition, for PHP functions, we studied cautiously their parameters to
determine which of them are crucial for our analysis. In the end, we dened around twenty tokens
that are sucient to describe the instructions of a PHP program.
Example 5.1. Function mysqli query and its parameters correspond to two tokens: ss for sensitive
sink; and var for variable or input if the parameter receives data originating from an entry point.
Although this function has three parameters (the last of them optional), notice that just one of
them (the second) is essential to represent.
Table 1 summarizes the currently dened ISL tokens. e rst column shows above the twenty
tokens that stand for PHP code elements whereas the last two tokens are necessary only for the
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Table 1. Intermediate Slice Language tokens.
Token Description PHP Function Taint
input entry point $ GET, $ POST, $ COOKIE, $ REQUEST Yes
$ HTTP GET VARS, $ HTTP POST VARS
$ HTTP COOKIE VARS, $ HTTP REQUEST VARS
$ FILES, $ SERVERS
var variable – No
sanit f sanitization function mysql escape string, mysql real escape string No
mysqli escape string, mysqli real escape string
mysqli stmt bind param, mysqli::escape string
mysqli::real escape string, mysqli stmt::bind param
htmlentities, htmlspecialchars, strip tags, urlencode
ss sensitive sink mysql query, mysql unbuered query, mysql db query Yes
mysqli query, mysqli real query, mysqli master query
mysqli multi query, mysqli stmt execute, mysqli execute
mysqli::query, mysqli::multi query, mysqli::real query
mysqli stmt::execute
fopen, le get contents, le, copy, unlink, move uploaded le
imagecreatefromgd2, imagecreatefromgd2part, imagecreatefromgd
imagecreatefromgif, imagecreatefromjpeg, imagecreatefrompng
imagecreatefromstring, imagecreatefromwbmp
imagecreatefromxbm, imagecreatefromxpm
require, require once, include, include once
readle
passthru, system, shell exec, exec, pcntl exec, popen
echo, print, printf, die, error, exit
le put contents, le get contents
eval
typechk str type checking string function is string, ctype alpha, ctype alnum Yes
typechk num type checking numeric function is int, is double, is oat, is integer No
is long, is numeric, is real, is scalar, ctype digit
contentchk content checking function preg match, preg match all, ereg, eregi No
strnatcmp, strcmp, strncmp, strncasecmp, strcasecmp
llchk ll checking function isset, empty, is null Yes
cond if instruction presence if No
join str join string function implode, join No
erase str erase string function trim, ltrim, rtrim Yes
replace str replace string function preg replace, preg lter, str ireplace, str replace No
ereg replace, eregi replace, str shue, chunk split
split str split string function str split, preg split, explode, split, spliti Yes
add str add string function str pad Yes/No
sub str substring function substr Yes/No
sub str replace replace substring function substr replace Yes/No
char5 substring with less than 6 chars – No
char6 substring with more than 5 chars – Yes
start where where the substring starts – Yes/No
conc concatenation operator – Yes/No
var vv variable tainted – Yes
miss miss value – Yes/No
description of the corpus and the implementation of the model. e next two columns explain
succinctly the purpose of the token and give a few examples. Column four denes the taintedness
status of each token which is used when building the corpus or performing the analysis.
A more cautious inspection of the tokens shows that they enable many relevant behaviors to
be expressed. For example: Since the manipulation of strings plays a fundamental role in the
exploitation of surface vulnerabilities, there are various tokens that enable a precise modeling of
these operations (e.g., erase str or sub str); Tokens char5 and char6 act as the amount of characters
that are manipulated by functions that extract or replace the contents from a user input; e place
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in a string where modications are applied (begin, middle or end) is described by start where;
Token cond can correspond to an if statement that might have validation functions over variables
(e.g., user inputs) as part of its conditional expression. is token allows the correlation among the
validated variables and the variables that appear inside the if branches.
ere are a few tokens that are context-sensitive, i.e., whose selection depends not only on the
code elements being translated but also on how they are utilized in the program. Tokens char5
and char6 are two examples as they depend on the substring length. If this length is only dened
at runtime, it is impossible to know precisely which token should be assigned. is ambiguity
may originate errors in the analysis, either leading to false positives or false negatives. However,
since we prefer to be conservative (i.e., report false positives instead of missing vulnerabilities),
in the situation where the length is undened, ISL uses the char6 token because it allows larger
payloads to be manipulated. Something similar occurs with the contentchk token that depends on
the verication paern.
ISL must be able to represent PHP instructions in all steps of the two phases of the approach.
When slices are extracted for analysis, ISL sets all variables to the default token value var. However,
when instructions are placed in the corpus or are processed by the detection procedure, it is
necessary to keep information about taintedness. In this case, tainted and untainted variables are
depicted respectively by the tokens var vv and var. e miss token is also used with the corpus
and it serves to normalize the length of sequences (Section 8).
5.2 Grammar
e ISL grammar is specied by the rules in Listing 1. It allows the representation of the code
elements included in the instructions into the tokens (Table 1, column 3 entries are transformed
into the column 1 tokens). A slice translated into ISL consists of a set of statements (line 2), each
one dened by either: a rule that covers various operations like string concatenation (lines 4-11); or
an conditional (line 12); or an assignment (line 13). e rules take into consideration the syntax of
the functions (in column 3 of the table) in order to convey: a sensitive sink (line 4), the sanitization
(line 5), the validation (line 6), the extraction and modication (lines 7-10), and the concatenation
(line 11).
1 grammar isl {
2 slice -isl : statement+
3 statement :
4 sensitive_sink
5 | sanitization
6 | validation
7 | mod_all
8 | mod_add
9 | mod_sub
10 | mod_rep
11 | concat
12 | cond statement+ cond?
13 | assignment
14 sensitive_sink : ss (param | concat)
15 sanitization : sanit_f param
16 validation : (typechk_str | typechk_num | fillchk | contentchk) param
17 mod_all : (join_str | erase_str | replace_str | split_str) param
18 mod_add : add_str param num_chars param
19 mod_sub : sub_str param num_chars start_where?
20 mod_rep : sub_str_replace param num_chars param start_where?
21 concat : (statement | param) (conc concat)?
22 assignment : (statement | param) attrib_var
23 param : input | var
24 attrib_var : var
25 num_chars : char5 | char6
26 }
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Listing 1. Grammar rules of ISL.
As we will see in Section 6, tokens will correspond to the observations of the HMM. However,
while a PHP assignment sets the value of the right-hand-side expression to the le-hand side, the
tokens will be processed from le to right by the model; therefore, the assignment rule in ISL
follows the HMM scheme.
Example 5.2. PHP instruction $u = $ GET[’user’]; is translated to input var. e assignment
and parameter rules (lines 13, 22 and 23) derive the input token, while the aribution rule produces
the var token (line 24).
6 THE SEQUENCE MODEL
is section presents the sequence model that supports vulnerability detection. It explains the graph
that represents the model, identifying the states and the observations that can be emied.
6.1 Hidden Markov Model
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a statistical generative model that represents a process as a
Markov chain with unobserved (hidden) states. It is a dynamic Bayesian network with nodes
that stand for random variables and edges that denote probabilistic dependencies between these
variables [3, 13, 32]. e variables are divided in two groups: observed variables – observations –
and hidden variables – states. A state transitions to other states with some probability and emits
observations (see example in Fig. 5).
A HMM is specied by the following: (1) a vocabulary, a set of words, symbols or tokens that
make up the sequence of observations; (2) the states, a group of states that classify the observations
of a sequence; (3) parameters, a set of probabilities where (i) the initial probabilities indicate the
probability of a sequence of observations begins at each start-state; (ii) the transition probabilities
between states; and (iii) the emission probabilities, which specify the probability of a state emiing
a given observation.
In the context of NLP, sequence models are used to classify a series of observations, which
correspond to the succession of words observed in a sentence. In particular, a HMM is used in
PoS tagging tasks, allowing the discovery of a series of states that best explains a new sequence
of observations. is is known as the decoding problem, which can be solved by the Viterbi
algorithm [37]. is algorithm resorts to dynamic programming to pick the best hidden state
sequence. Although the Viterbi algorithm employs bigrams to generate the i-th state, it takes into
account all previously generated states, but this is not directly visible. In a nutshell, the algorithm
iteratively obtains the probability distribution for the i-th state based on the probabilities computed
for the (i-1)-th state, taking into consideration the parameters of the model.
e parameters of the HMM are learned by processing a corpus that is created for training.
Observations and state transitions are counted, and aerwards the counts are normalized in order
to obtain probability distributions; a smoothing procedure may also be applied to deal with rare
events in the training data (e.g., add-one smoothing).
6.2 Vocabulary and States
As our HMM operates over the program instructions translated into ISL, the vocabulary is composed
of the previously described ISL tokens. e states are selected to represent the fundamental
operations that can be performed on the input data as it ows through a slice. Five states were
dened as displayed Table 2. e nal state of an instruction in ISL is either vulnerable (Taint)
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Table 2. HMM states and the observations they emit.
State Description Emitted observations
Taint Tainted conc, input, var, var vv
N-Taint Not tainted conc, cond, input, var, var vv, ss
San Sanitization input, sanit f, var, var vv
Val Validation contentchk, llchk, input, typechk num,
typechk str, var, var vv
Chg str Change string add str, char5, char6, erase str, input,
join str, replace str, split str, start where,
sub str, sub str replace, var, var vv
or not-vulnerable (N-Taint). However, in order to aain an accurate detection, it is necessary to
take into account the sanitization (San), validation (Val) and modication (Chg str) of the user
inputs and the variables that may depend on them. erefore, these three factors are represented
as intermediate states in the model. As strings are on the base of web surface vulnerabilities, these
three states allow the model to determine the intermediate state when an application manipulates
them.
6.3 Graph of the Model
Our HMM consists of the graph in Fig. 4, where the nodes constitute the states and the edges the
transitions between them. e dashed squares next to the nodes hold the observations that can be
emied in each state.
An ISL instruction corresponds to a sequence of observations. e sequence can start in any
state except Val. However, it can reach the Val state for example due to conditionals that check
the input data. In the example of Fig. 2 (b), in line 3, one notices a sequence that initiates with a
cond observation that could be emied by the N-Taint initial state. en, it would transit to the
Val state due to the check that is carried out in the if conditional. When the processing of the
sequence completes, the model is always either in the Taint or N-Taint states. erefore, the nal
Fig. 4. Model graph of the proposed HMM.
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state determines the overall classication of the statement, i.e., if the instruction is vulnerable or
not.
Example 6.1. Fig. 5 shows an instantiation of the model for one sequence. e sanitization
instruction is translated to the ISL sequence sanit f input var. e sequence starts in the San
state and emits the sanit f observation; next it remains in the same state and emits the input
observation; then, it transits to N-Taint state, emiing the var observation (untainted variable).
(a) PHP instruction: $p = mysqli real escape string($con, $ GET[’user’])
ISL instruction: sanit f input var
Sequence: 〈sanit f,San〉 〈input,San〉 〈var,N-Taint〉
Fig. 5. Graph instantiation for an example sequence.
7 LEARNING AND VULNERABILITY DETECTION
is section explains the main activities related with our approach. e learning phase encompasses
a number of activities that culminate with the computation of the parameters of the HMM model.
Following that, the vulnerabilities are found by processing the slices of the target application
through model in the detection phase. Fig. 3 illustrates the fundamental steps.
7.1 Slice Extraction and Translation Process
e slice extractor analyses les with the source code, gathering the slices that start with an entry
point and eventually reach some security-sensitive sink. e instructions between these points
are those that implement the application logic based on the user input data. e slice extractor
performs intra- and inter-procedural analysis, as it tracks the inputs and its dependencies along
the program, walking through the invoked functions. e analysis is context-sensitive as it takes
into account the results of function calls.
A translation process occurs when the instructions are collected and consists in representing
them as ISL tokens. However, ISL does not maintain much information about the variables portrayed
by the var token. is knowledge is nevertheless crucial for a more accurate vulnerability detection
as variables are related to the inputs in distinct manners and their contents can suer all sorts of
modications. erefore, to address this issue, we update a data structure called variable map while
the slice is translated. e map associates each occurrence of var in the slice-isl with the name
of the variable that appears in the source code. is lets us track how input data propagates to
dierent variables when the slice code elements are processed.
ere is an entry in the variable map per instruction. Each entry starts with a ag, 1 or 0,
indicating if the statement is an assignment or not. e rest of the entry includes one value per
token of the instruction, which is either the name of the variable (without the $) or the - character
(stands for a token that is not occupied by a variable).
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Example 7.1. Fig. 1(a) displays a PHP code snippet that is vulnerable to SQLI and Fig. 1(b) shows
the translation into ISL and the variable map (ignore the right-hand side for now). e rst line is
the assignment of an input to a variable, $u = $ POST[’username’];. As explained above, it becomes
input var in ISL. e variable map entry 1 - u is initialized to 1 to denote that the instruction is
an assignment to the var in the second position. e next line is an assignment of a SQL query
composed by concatenating constant substrings with a variable. It is represented in ISL by var
var and in the variable map by 1 u q. e last line corresponds to a sensitive sink (ss) and two
variables.
Example 7.2. Fig. 2 has a slightly more complex code snippet. e slice extractor takes from the
code two slices: lines {1, 2, 3, 4} and {1, 3, 5, 6}. e rst prevents an aack with a form of input
validation, but the second is vulnerable to XSS. e corresponding ISL and variable map are shown
in the middle columns. e interesting cases are in lines 3 and 4, which are the if statement and its
true branch. Both are prexed with the cond token and the former also ends with the same token.
is cond termination makes a distinction between the two types of instructions. In addition, the
sequence model will understand that variables from the former may inuence those that appear in
laer instructions.
7.2 Process of Creating the Corpus
e corpus plays an important role as it incorporates the knowledge that will be learned by
the model, namely which instructions may lead to a aw. In our case, the corpus is a group of
instructions (not slices) converted to ISL, where tokens are tagged with information related to taint
propagation. e model sees the tokens of an instruction in ISL as a sequence of observations. e
tags correspond to the states of the model. erefore, an alternative way to look at the corpus is as
a group of sequences of observations annotated with states.
e corpus is built in four steps: (1) collection of a group of instructions that are vulnerable and
not-vulnerable, which are placed in a bag; (2) representation of each instruction in the bag in ISL;
(3) annotation of the tokens of every instruction (e.g., as tainted or sanitized), i.e., associate a state
to each observation of the sequence; and (4) removal of duplicated entries in the bag. In the end, an
instruction becomes a list of pairs of 〈token,state〉.
In the rst step, it is necessary to get representative instructions of all classes of bugs that one
wants to catch, various forms of validations, diverse forms of manipulating (changing) strings,
and dierent combinations of code elements. To achieve this in practice, we can gather individual
instructions or/and we can select a large number of slices captured from open source training
applications. erefore, both the collection and representation can be performed in an automatic
manner (with the slice collector module), but the annotation of the tokens is done manually (as in
all supervised machine learning approaches).
Example 7.3. Instruction $var = $ POST[’paramater’] becomes input var in ISL, and is annotated
as 〈input,Taint〉 〈var vv,Taint〉. Both states are Taint (compromised) because the input can be
the source of malicious data, and therefore is always Taint, and then the taint propagates to the
variable.
As mentioned in the previous section, the token var vv is not produced when slices are translated
into ISL, but used in the corpus to represent variables with state Taint (tainted variables). In fact,
during translation into ISL variables are not known to be tainted or not, so they are represented
by the var token. In the corpus, if the state of the variable is annotated as Taint, the variable is
portrayed by var vv, forming the pair 〈var vv,Taint〉.
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e state of the last observation of a sequence corresponds to a nal state, and therefore it can
only be Taint (vulnerable) or N-Taint (not-vulnerable). If this state is tainted then it means that
a malicious input is able to propagate and potentially compromise the execution. erefore, in
this case, the instruction is perceived as vulnerable. Otherwise, the instruction is deemed correct
(non-vulnerable).
Example 7.4. Instruction $v = htlmentities ($ GET[’user’]) is translated to sanit f input
var and placed in the corpus as the succession of pairs 〈sanit f,San〉 〈input,San〉 〈var,N-Taint〉.
e rst two tokens are annotated with the San state because function htlmentities sanitizes its
parameter; the last token is labeled with the N-Taint state, meaning that the ultimate state of the
sequence is not tainted.
1 1$var = $_POST[`parameter ']
2 1$var = $_GET[`parameter ']
3 1$var = htmlentities($_POST[`parameter '])
4 1$var = mysqli_real_escape_string($con , $_GET[`parameter '])
5 1$var = htmlentities($var)
6 1$var = "SELECT field FROM table WHERE field = $var"
7 1$var = mysqli_query($con , $var)
8 1$var = mysql_query($var)
9 1echo $var
10 1include($var)
11 1$var = (isset($var)) ? $var : ''
12 1if (isset($var) && $var > number)
13 1if (is_string($var) && preg_match('pattern ', $var))
14 1if (isset($var) && preg_match('pattern ', $var) && is_int($var))
Listing 2. Creating the corpus: collection step.
Example 7.5. Listing 2 displays fourteen PHP instructions collected from vulnerable and non-
vulnerable slices. e representation of the instructions into ISL is illustrated in Listing 3. It is
possible to observe that some instructions may have more than one representation, depending
if the extracted slice is vulnerable or not. For example, the instruction h position in Listing 3
appears as two series (the two lines immediately below of it) corresponding to the sanitization of an
untainted and a tainted variable, respectively. In the listing, it is also visible the dierence between
the var and var vv tokens. Listing 4 has the nal corpus that is produced aer applying the last two
steps. Each sequence of observations is annotated with the state as explained above. e duplicated
sequences are eliminated as several PHP instructions can result in the same sequence. For example,
PHP instructions in lines 1 and 2 (Listing 2) become the same sequence (line 1 of Listing 4).
7.3 Configuring the HMM
e sequence model was mostly dened in Section 6. e only missing piece of information are
the parameters, i.e., the various probabilities to arrive to the start-states, to do the state transitions,
and to perform the emissions of the observations. e probabilities are computed from the corpus
by counting the number of occurrences of observations and/or states. e result is 3 matrices of
probabilities with dimensions of (1 × s), (s × s) and (t × s), where s and t are the number of states
and tokens of the model. e matrices are calculated as follows:
Start-state probabilities: count how many sequences begin in each state. en, get the probability
for each state by dividing these counts by the number of sequences of the corpus. is produces a
matrix with the dimension (1 × 5).
Example 7.6. To obtain the start-state probability of the San state, we count how many sequences
begin with the San state and divide by the size of the corpus.
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1 $var = $_POST[`parameter ']
input var_vv
2 $var = $_GET[`parameter ']
input var_vv
3 $var = htmlentities($_POST[`parameter '])
sanit_f input var
4 $var = mysqli_real_escape_string($con , $_GET[`parameter '])
sanit_f input var
5 $var = htmlentities($var)
sanit_f var var
sanit_f var_vv var
6 $var = "SELECT field FROM table WHERE field = $var"
var var
var_vv var_vv
7 $var = mysqli_query($con , $var)
ss var var
ss var_vv var_vv
8 $var = mysql_query($var)
ss var var
ss var_vv var_vv
9 echo $var
ss var_vv
ss var
10 include($var)
ss var_vv
ss var
11 $var = (isset($var)) ? $var : ''
var var
var_vv var_vv
12 if (isset($var) && $var > number)
cond fillchk var_vv cond
cond fillchk var cond
13 if (is_string($var) && preg_match('pattern ', $var))
cond typechk_str var_vv contentchk var_vv cond
cond typechk_str var_vv contentchk var cond
cond typechk_str var contentchk var_vv cond
cond typechk_str var contentchk var cond
14 if (isset($var) && preg_match('pattern ', $var) && is_int($var))
cond typechk_str var_vv contentchk var_vv typechk_int var_vv cond
cond typechk_str var_vv contentchk var_vv typechk_int var cond
cond typechk_str var_vv contentchk var typechk_int var_vv cond
cond typechk_str var_vv contentchk var typechk_int var cond
cond typechk_str var contentchk var_vv typechk_int var_vv cond
cond typechk_str var contentchk var_vv typechk_int var cond
cond typechk_str var contentchk var typechk_int var_vv cond
cond typechk_str var contentchk var typechk_int var cond
Listing 3. Creating the corpus: representation step.
Transition probabilities: count how many times in the corpus a certain state i transits to a state
k (including itself). e transition probability is obtained by dividing this count by the number
of pairs of states that appear in the corpus that begin with the i state. e resulting matrix has a
dimension of (5 × 5), keeping the various probabilities for all possible transitions between the ve
states.
Example 7.7. e transition probability for the N-Taint state to the Taint state is the number of
occurrences of this transition in the corpus divided by the number of pairs of states that begin in
the N-Taint state.
Emission probabilities: count how many times a certain observation is emied by a particular state,
i.e., count how many times a certain pair 〈token,state〉 appears in the corpus. en, calculate the
emission probability by dividing this count by the total number of pairs 〈token,state〉 that occur
for that specic state. e resulting matrix – called global emission probabilities matrix – has a
dimension of (22 × 5) in order to have a probability for the 22 tokens that could emied by each of
the 5 states.
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1 <input ,Taint > <var_vv ,Taint >
2 <sanit_f ,San > <input ,San > <var ,N-Taint >
3 <sanit_f ,San > <var ,San > <var ,N-Taint >
4 <sanit_f ,San > <var_vv ,San > <var ,N-Taint >
5 <var ,N-Taint > <var ,N-Taint >
6 <var_vv ,Taint > <var_vv ,Taint >
7 <ss,N-Taint > <var ,N-Taint > <var ,N-Taint >
8 <ss,N-Taint > <var_vv ,Taint > <var_vv ,Taint >
9 <ss,N-Taint > <var_vv ,Taint >
10 <ss,N-Taint > <var ,N-Taint >
11 <cond ,N-Taint > <fillchk ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
12 <cond ,N-Taint > <fillchk ,Val > <var ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
13 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
14 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
15 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
16 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
17 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var_vv ,Val >
<typechk_int ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
18 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var_vv ,Val >
<typechk_int ,Val > <var ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
19 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var ,Val > <typechk_int ,Val >
<var_vv ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
20 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var ,Val > <typechk_int ,Val >
<var ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
21 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <typechk_int ,Val >
<var_vv ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
22 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var_vv ,Val > <typechk_int ,Val >
<var ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
23 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var ,Val > <typechk_int ,Val >
<var_vv ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
24 <cond ,N-Taint > <typechk_str ,Val > <var ,Val > <contentchk ,Val > <var ,Val > <typechk_int ,Val >
<var ,Val > <cond ,N-Taint >
Listing 4. Creating the corpus: annotation and removal steps.
Example 7.8. To obtain the probability that the Taint state emits the var vv token (〈var vv,Taint〉),
rst get the number of occurrences of this pair in the corpus, and next divided it by the total number
of pairs of the Taint state.
Zero-probabilities should be avoided because the Viterbi algorithm uses multiplication to calculate
the probability of moving to the next state, and therefore one needs to ensure that this multiplication
is never zero. e add-one smoothing technique [13] can address this issue and help to compute
the values of the parameters. is technique simply adds a unit to all counts, making zero-counts
equal to one and the associated probability dierent from zero.
7.4 Detecting Vulnerabilities
Given the source code of an application, the collector gathers the slices that should be examined, and
then every slice is inspected separately. To commence, the instructions of the slice are translated to
ISL. is means that the slice becomes a list of sequences of observations, each one corresponding
to a PHP instruction. e discovery of aws is accomplished by processing the sequences in the
order of appearance, starting with the rst and concluding with the last.
e HMM model is applied to each sequence of observations to nd out the associated states.
We resort to an extension of the Viterbi algorithm to perform this task. e algorithm employs
dynamic programming to compute the most likely succession of states that explain a sequence of
observations. As the algorithm nishes with a sequence, a nal state comes out, either as Taint
or N-Taint. is information is then propagated to the next sequence. e process is repeated for
all sequences, and the nal state of the last sequence denes the outcome for the slice — either as
vulnerable (if it is tainted) or non-vulnerable (if it is untainted).
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
1:16 Medeiros, et al.
For the classication to be carried out eectively, it is necessary to spread faithfully the taintedness
among the sequences under analysis, which means keeping information about the variables that
are tainted. For this purpose, we use three artifacts that are updated as the execution evolves:
• Tainted List (TL): as sequences are processed, it keeps the identiers of the variables that
are perceived as tainted;
• Conditional Tainted List (CTL): contains the inputs (token input) and tainted variables
(belong to TL) that have been validated (e.g., by tokens typechk num and contentchk);
• Sanitized List (SL): has essentially a similar aim as CTL, except that it maintains the variables
that are sanitized or modied (e.g., with functions that manipulate strings).
Example 7.9. Fig. 2 has the PHP code for the two slices composed of lines {1, 2, 3, 4} and {1, 3, 5,
6} respectively. Aer processing the rst slice, TL = {u, a} and CTL = {u, a} as variable u is the
parameter of the contentchk token and variable a is the parameter of the typechk int token. e
nal state is N-Taint because variable u is included in CTL. In the other slice, TL = {u, a} and CTL
= { } since there is no validation and the nal state is Taint.
In our implementation, the Viterbi algorithm was extended to explore the information kept in
the variable map and in these artifacts (further details in Section 8.1.1). Handling a sequence of
observations becomes a three step procedure: (1) a preprocessing step is carried out – beforeVit;
(2) then, the decoding step of the Viterbi algorithm is applied – decodeVit; (3) and lastly, a post-
processing step is executed – afterVit. ey work as follows:
beforeVit: the variable map is visited to get the name of the variable associated to each var
observation. e TL and SL are checked to determine if they hold that name. In case
the sequence starts with the token cond, the list CTL is also accessed. If a variable only
belongs to TL, then the var observation is modied to var vv, thus capturing the eect of
the variable being tainted. Finally, an emission probability sub-matrix for the observations
of the sequence is also retrieved from the global emission probabilities matrix;
decodeVit: for each observation, the Viterbi algorithm calculates the probability of each state to
emit it, considering the probabilities of emission, of transition, and of the states already
discovered. e multiplication of these three probabilities results in a probability called
score of state. e state that is assigned to an observation is the one that has the highest
score. e process is repeated for all observations and the state of the last observation is
the one that classies the sequence as Taint or N-Taint.
In more detail, the three probabilities are obtained as follows: emission come from the
sub-matrix of emission probabilities, regarding the observations that will be processed;
transition are from the matrix of transition probabilities; previous state is determined by
picking up the highest score computed for the previous observation. is last probability
brings to the calculation the order in which the observations appear in the sequence and
the knowledge already discovered about the previous observations. However, since this
knowledge does not exist for the rst observation of the sequence, in this case the start-state
probabilities are used;
afterVit: if the sequence is an assignment (i.e., the last observation of the sequence is a var token
and the entry in the variable map starts with 1), then the corresponding variable name is
obtained from variable map. Next, the TL is updated: (i) inserting the variable name if the
nal state is Taint; or (ii) removing it if the state is N-Taint and the variable is in TL; in
the presence of a sanitization sequence, the variable name is also added to SL. In case the
sequence is an if condition (i.e., the rst and last observations are a cond token), then the
variable map is searched for each var and var vv observation. Next, the TL is searched to
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discover if it includes the name, and in that situation, the CTL is updated by inserting that
name.
e end result of these actions is that one gets the ability to keep the relevant knowledge about
the propagation of inputs through the slice, and thus determine how they can inuence the sensitive
sinks.
Example 7.10. Fig. 1(a) and (b) shows an example of the detection of a bug. It comprises from le
to right: the PHP code, the representation in ISL, the variable map, and the TL aer observations
are classied. In line 1, the Viterbi algorithm is applied and as result the var observation is tainted
because by default an input observation is so; the model classies it correctly and variable u is
inserted in TL. In line 2, the rst var observation is updated to var vv because it corresponds to
variable u that belongs to TL, and then the Viterbi algorithm is applied; the var vv var sequence
is classied by the model and the nal state is Taint; therefore, variable q is inserted in TL. e
process is repeated for the next line, allowing the discovery of the aw. Fig. 1(c) presents the
decoding of the slice while the processing progresses. Here, it is possible to see the places where
var is replaced by var vv, with the relevant variable name as sux. In addition, the states of each
observation are also added. By following the generated states, one can understand the eects of
the code execution (without actually running it), which variables are tainted, and why the code is
vulnerable. e state of the last observation indicates the nal classication — a vulnerability.
8 IMPLEMENTATION AND INITIAL ASSESSMENT
Our approach is implemented in the DEKANT tool. A corpus was also created to train the model.
is corpus can be extended in the future with additional annotated sequences, allowing the tool
to evolve its knowledge and detection capabilities.
8.1 Implementation of DEKANT
DEKANT is programmed in Java and its architecture is divided in four major modules, which are
explained below in more detail:
Knowledge extractor: operates separately from the other modules and is executed when the corpus
is built or later modied. It runs in three steps: (i) the sequences composed of series of annotated
tokens are loaded from a plain text le. Each sequence is separated in pairs 〈token,state〉 and the
elements of each pair are inserted in the matrices called observations and states. Since sequences
normally have dierent numbers of pairs, it becomes necessary to normalize the length of all
sequences in the corpus. is is accomplished by rst determining the length of the largest sequence,
and then by padding shorter sequences with the miss token together with the state of the last
observation (i.e., with pairs 〈miss,Taint〉 or 〈miss,N-Taint〉) to ensure that all sequences have the
same length; (ii) then, the various probabilities of the model are computed as explained in the
previous section; (iii) lastly, all relevant information about the model is saved in a plain text le to
be loaded by the vulnerability detector module.
Slice collector: uses a lexer and a parser to process PHP code (based on ANTLR2). It searches the
application les for places where inputs arrive from the user and then tracks the data ows until
either a security-critical instruction is reached or the program exits. Slices that have both an
entry point and a sensitive sink are passed to the translator (and the others are discarded). e
information about which entry points and sensitive sinks should be considered is provided in a
conguration le.
2hps://www.antlr.org/
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Slice translator: e module reads conguration les describing the classes of tokens, e.g., containing
the PHP functions that are represented by tokens. Some of them are transversal to any class of
vulnerability, whereas others are specic to a particular bug. For example, the input le contains
$ GET and $ POST global arrays and the ss xss le has the security-sensitive functions associated
with XSS (e.g., echo). e module rst parses the slice and next veries which tokens should
be assigned to each PHP instruction, following the ISL grammar rules. Simultaneously, it also
generates the variable map.
Vulnerability detector: works in three steps to nd the bugs. (i) the probabilities are loaded from
a le and the model is setup internally; (ii) the slice translated into the intermediate language is
processed using the modied Viterbi algorithm. Sometimes, it occurs that a sequence has more
observations than the largest sequence that was seen in the corpus. When this happens, it is
necessary to divide the sequence in sub-sequences with at most the maximum corpus sequence
length. en, each one is classied separately, but the algorithm is careful to ensure that the initial
probability of the following sub-sequence is equal to the probability resulting from the previous
sub-sequence; (iii) lastly, the various probabilities are estimated for a sequence of observations to
be explained by particular sequences of states, and the most probable is chosen. An alert message
is issued if a vulnerability is found.
8.1.1 Extensions to the Viterbi algorithm. We extended the Viterbi algorithm with the two proce-
dures of Section 7.4 (beforeVit and afterVit) to track the propagation of inputs while processing
a slice and to explore the data structures that keep relevant knowledge about variables (e.g., the
three artifacts TL, CTL and SL).
Listing 5 presents the beforeVit preprocessing procedure that is run before the Viterbi algorithm.
beforeVit does a few tests to manipulate some ags and change the data structures. For each
observation (obs) in the sequence (inst slice isl) there are checks to nd out: (i) the presence
of sanitization (sanit f) or a cond tokens. For the laer case, it is veried the obs position in the
sequence to discover if the instruction is an if statement, an instruction inside of a conditional
statement, or an else statement (lines 19 to 30); (ii) an if statement is searched for validation
functions and if their parameters are a variable or an input (i.e., var or input). In such case, var or
input are inserted in CTL (lines 32 to 48); (iii) an instruction inside an if statement is checked if the
var and input tokens belong to CTL and/or SL. VM (variable map) is accessed to get the name of
variable associated to var token. If the token input belongs to the SL or CTL lists, it is replaced by
the var token because it has to loose its taintedness (we recall that by default this token is tainted
and the var token is untainted, so this replacement is required) (lines 50 to 61); (iv) in presence
of another instruction and if the observation is a var token, i.e., the inst slice isl is out of the
validation scope, the name of variable is taken from VM and checked if it belongs to TL but not
in SL. In such a case, the variable is tainted, and the observation is replaced by the var vv token
(lines 63 to 71). For all four verications, the emission probability of the observation in analysis
is retrieved from the global emission probabilities matrix (GEP), then it is inserted in the emission
probabilities matrix (EP) of the inst slice isl (line 72).
Aerwards, the traditional Viterbi algorithm is executed (decodeVit step as explained in Section
7.4) and then the post-processing afterVit procedure runs.
1 /* >>> Data structures and variables <<<
2 ** VM - variable map
3 ** TL - tainted list
4 ** CTL - conditional tainted list
5 ** SL - sanitized list
6 ** obs_index - index of obs in the instruction_slice_isl
7 ** var_name - variable name of the obs from inst_slice_isl
8 ** condition - variable for controlling if stattements
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9 ** val - variable for controlling validation functions
10 ** san - variable for controlling sanitization functions
11 ** EP - emission probability matrix of instruction_slice_isl
12 ** GEP - global emission probabilities matrix
13 ** obs_ep - emission probability of the obs in analysis
14 */
15
16 val = 0
17 san = 0
18 for each obs in inst_slice_isl do
19 if obs = sanit_f then san = 1 end_if
20
21 if obs = cond then
22 if obs_index = 1 then
23 if size(inst_slice_isl) = 1 then condition = 0 else condition = 1 end_if
24 else
25 condition = 2
26 end_if
27 get obs_ep from GEP
28 end_if
29
30 if condition = 1 and obs_index <> 1 then
31 if obs in [typechk_num , contentchk] then
32 val = 1
33 end_if
34
35 if obs = var and val = 1 then
36 get var_name of obs from VM
37 insert var_name in CTL
38 val = 0
39 end_if
40
41 if obs = input and val = 1 then
42 insert input in CTL
43 val = 0
44 end_if
45 get obs_ep from GEP
46 end_if
47
48 if condition = 2 then
49 if obs = var then
50 get var_name of obs from VM
51 if var_name in [CTL , SL] then
52 get obs_ep from GEP
53 end_if
54 end_if
55 if obs = input and input in [CTL , SL] then
56 obs = var
57 get obs_ep from GEP
58 end_if
59 end_if
60
61 if condition = 0 then
62 if obs = var then
63 get var_name of obs from VM
64 if var_name in TL and not in SL then
65 obs = var_vv
66 end_if
67 end_if
68 get obs_ep from GEP
69 end_if
70 insert obs_ep in EP
71 end_do
Listing 5. beforeVit extension to the Viterbi algorithm.
Listing 6 shows afterVit. It takes as inputs the nal state of the inst slice isl (state) and the
assignment value (value) of the instruction stored in VM (lines 11-12), and then makes the following
checks: (i) if the instruction is an assignment, then the last observation of the sequence is a variable
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(var or var vv token), so the name of the variable (var name) is taken from VM (lines 14-15). (ii)
if the instruction is classied as Taint, then the assignment variable is tainted, so the var name is
put in TL. If this var name already belongs to SL, it is removed from this list (lines 16-20). (iii) if
the instruction is classied as N-Taint, then the assignment variable is untainted, and therefore it
can be removed from TL. Additionally, it is veried if the instruction is a result of a sanitization
operation, and in such case the name is inserted in SL (lines 22-26).
1 /* >>> Data structures and variables <<<
2 ** VM - variable map
3 ** TL - tainted list
4 ** SL - sanitized list
5 ** state - state of the last obs from inst_slice_isl
6 ** value - assignament value of inst_slice_isl on VM
7 ** var_name - variable name of the obs from inst_slice_isl
8 ** san - variable for controlling sanitization functions
9 */
10
11 get state of inst_slice_isl
12 get value from VM
13
14 if value = 1 then
15 get var_name of the last_obs from VM
16 if state = taint then
17 insert var_name in TL
18 if var_name in SL then
19 remove var_name from SL
20 end_if
21 else
22 if san = 1 then
23 insert var_name in SL
24 san = 0
25 if var_name in TL then
26 remove var_name from TL
27 end_if
28 end_if
29 end_if
30 end_if
Listing 6. aerVit extension to the Viterbi algorithm.
8.2 Corpus Construction and Assessment
e model needs to classify correctly the sequences of observations or, in our case, needs to
detect vulnerabilities without mistakes. Since the model is congured with the corpus, its quality
depends strongly on incorporating valid and enough information in the corpus. erefore, to build
the corpus, we resorted to a method inspired in Jurafsky and Martin [13]. e method operates
iteratively in three phases to gradually assess and improve the resulting model. e evaluation
phase veries if the model outputs correctly a sequence of observations O for a given sequence of
states S . e decoding phase determines if the model outputs a S that explains correctly a given O .
is phase corresponds to the objective of our approach. e last phase, re-learning, veries if the
model needs adjustments to its parameters in order to maximize the results of the previous phases.
It consists of enhancing the model by adding more sequences to the corpus and running another
cycle of the method.
Aer applying the method, the resulting corpus had 510 slices, where 414 are vulnerable and
96 are non-vulnerable. ese slices were extracted from various open source PHP applications3
and had aws from the twelve classes presented in Section 3. e probability matrices that were
computed based on this corpus are shown in Fig. 6.
3bayar, bayaran, BuerFly, CurrentCost, DVWA 1.0.7, emoncms, glfusion-1.3.0, hotelmis, Measureit 1.14, Mfm-0.13, mongodb-master, Mul-
tilidae 2.3.5, openkb.0.0.2, Participants-database-1.5.4.8, phpbrkplus-2.2, SAMATE, superlinks, vicnum15, ZiPEC 0.32, Wordpress 3.9.1.
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[
0.062 0.323 0.062 0.015 0.538
]
(a) initial-state probabilities.

0.619 0.099 0.174 0.059 0.333
0.115 0.641 0.304 0.353 0.373
0.027 0.028 0.435 0.059 0.020
0.009 0.033 0.043 0.471 0.020
0.009 0.006 0.043 0.059 0.255

(b) transition probabilities.

0.085 0.015 0.103 0.030 0.075
0.016 0.294 0.051 0.212 0.075
0.326 0.010 0.154 0.030 0.075
0.008 0.005 0.256 0.030 0.015
0.008 0.051 0.026 0.030 0.015
0.380 0.406 0.026 0.030 0.015
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.091 0.015
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.091 0.015
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.061 0.015
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.061 0.015
0.008 0.076 0.026 0.030 0.015
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.030 0.060
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.030 0.060
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.030 0.060
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.030 0.060
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.030 0.134
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.030 0.104
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.030 0.134
0.008 0.061 0.026 0.030 0.015
0.070 0.020 0.026 0.030 0.015
0.008 0.005 0.026 0.030 0.015
0.270 0.208 0.056 0.061 0.015

(c) global emission probabilities.
Fig. 6. Parameters of our HMM model extracted from the corpus. Columns correspond to the 5 states (in
the same order of column 1 of Table 2). The lines of matrix (c) are the tokens (in the same order of column 1
of Table 1).
To perform a preliminary assessment the model, we applied a 10-fold cross validation [8]. is
form of validation involves dividing the training data (the corpus of 510 slices) in ten folds. en, the
model is trained with a sub-corpus of nine of the folds and tested with the tenth fold. is process
is repeated ten times to evaluate every fold with a model trained with the rest. e metrics that are
used in the evaluation are: Accuracy (acc) measures the ratio of well-classied slices (as vulnerable
and non-vulnerable) over the total number of slices (N ), whereas precision (pr) assesses the fraction
of classied bugs that are really vulnerabilities. e objective is high accuracy and precision or,
similarly, to minimize the false positive rate (fpr) which is the rate of generating false alarms for
slices that are correct, and to minimize the false negative rate (fnr) which is the rate of missing
certain vulnerable slices. Given that tp and tn are the well-classied instances as vulnerable and
non-vulnerable, while fp is the false alarms and fn is the missing alarms, the metrics are computed
with: acc = (tp + tn)/N ; pr = tp/(tp + f p); f pr = f p/(f p + tn); and f nr = f n/(f n + tp).
Table 3 presents a confusion matrix for the alerts produced by DEKANT in the rst two phases
of the method. For example, the rst row says that DEKANT issued 419 alerts in the evaluation
phase but that 14 of them were mistakes (columns 2 and 3). In the evaluation phase, the precision
and accuracy are very high, around 0.97 and 0.95, and the rates are small (fpr is 0.15 and fnr is
0.02). In the decoding phase, the results are even more positive, with a precision and accuracy
approximately of 0.96 and rates of 0.17 and 0.005 (almost null fnr rate). Since there is a trade-o
between the two rates, it is interesting to notice that there is a very low fnr that leads to a few FPs
(wrong alerts). is is advantageous because the alternative would mean missing vulnerabilities.
So, these results provide promising evidence of the excellent performance of DEKANT, something
that we will be check more thoroughly in the next section.
9 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our experimental evaluation addresses the following questions about DEKANT: (1) Is the tool
able to discover novel vulnerabilities? (Section 9.1); (2) Can it classify correctly various classes of
vulnerabilities? (Section 9.1); (3) Is DEKANT more accurate and precise than tools that search for
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
1:22 Medeiros, et al.
Table 3. Confusion matrix. Observed is the reality, where there are 414 slices with flaws and 96 correct.
Predicted is the output of DEKANT with our corpus (419 vuln., 91 not vuln. in the evaluation phase; 428 vuln.,
82 not vuln. in the decoding phase).
Observed
Evaluation Decoding
Vul N-Vul Vul N-Vul
Predicted Vul 405 14 412 16N-Vul 9 82 2 80
vulnerabilities in plugins (Section 9.2); tools that do data mining using standard classiers (Section
9.3); and, tools that do taint analysis (Section 9.4)?
9.1 Open Source Soware Evaluation
is section assesses the ability of DEKANT to classify dierent vulnerabilities by analyzing 23
WordPress plugins [41] and 23 packages of real web applications. All of these are wrien in the PHP
language. e plugins are used to determine if the tool is useful for the discovery of new (zero-day)
vulnerabilities. e applications serve as a ground truth for the evaluation, since they have known
vulnerabilities — 13 of the packages contain bugs found by [18] and the other 10 packages have
aws disclosed by various researchers in the past. In every test, DEKANT resorted to the corpus
explained in the previous section (however, none of the programs utilized in the evaluation was
employed to build the corpus). All outputs of the tool were conrmed by us manually to pinpoint
valid detections and mistakes.
9.1.1 Zero-day Vulnerabilities in Plugins. WordPress is the most adopted Content Management
System (CMS) worldwide, and therefore its plugins are interesting targets for our study. We
selected a diverse set of plugins based on two criteria, the development team and the number of
Table 4. Vulnerable slices in plugins found by DEKANT.
WordPress Plugin Slices Real Vulnerabilities FP
SQLI XSS Files* SCD HI CS
Appointment Booking Calendar 15 3 4
Login by Auth0 1 1
Authorizer 2 2
BuddyPress 4
Contact formgenerator 14 11
CP Appointment Calendar 11 2
Easy2map 13 1 2
Ecwid Shopping Cart 1 1
Gantry Framework 3 3
Google Maps Travel Route 10 1 2 1
Lightbox Plus Colorbox 8 8
Payment form for Paypal pro 19 2
Recipes writer 8 4
ResAds 17 17
Simple support ticket system 37 18
e Cart Press eCommerce Shopping 25 8 17
WebKite 1 1
WP Easy Cart eCommerce Shopping 78 13 6 29 5 5 2
WP Marketplace 45 2 24 3
WP Shop 22 7 10
WP ToolBar Removal Node 1 1
WP ultimate recipe 7 1
WP Web Scraper 3 3
Total 345 66 106 31 5 5 2 5
*DT & RFI, LFI vulnerabilities
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Table 5. Slices in open source applications processed by DEKANT.
Web application Version Files LoC Analysis Slices Classication Vulnerability class
time (s) Vul San VC Total Vul N-Vul FP FN SQLI XSS Files* SCD HI CS LDAP SF
Admin Control Panel Lite 2 0.10.2 14 1984 1 81 1 82 81 1 9 72
Clip Bucket 2.7.0.4 597 148129 11 22 4 5 31 22 6 3 10 11 1
Clip Bucket 2.8 606 149830 12 26 4 5 35 26 6 3 4 10 11 1
Ldap address book 0.22 18 4615 2 40 50 90 40 50 39 1
Minutes 0.42 19 2670 1 10 10 10 9 1
Mle Moodle 0.8.8.5 235 59723 18 7 3 10 6 3 1 5 1
Php Open Chat 3.0.2 249 83899 7 11 11 11 10 1
Pivotx 2.3.10 254 108893 10 4 3 6 13 4 9 1 2 1
Play sms 1.3.1 1420 248875 19 6 2 8 5 2 1 5
RCR AEsir 0.11a 8 396 1 13 1 14 13 1 9 3 1
SAE 1.1 150 47207 7 148 38 15 201 148 48 5 61 65 20 1 1
Tomahawk Mail 2.0 155 16742 3 3 3 6 3 3 2 1
vfront 0.99.3 438 93042 15 136 50 30 216 134 78 2 2 32 68 24 10
Total 4163 966005 107 507 149 71 727 503 206 14 4 117 295 72 1 14 1 2 1
*DT & RFI, LFI vulnerabilities
downloads. For the former, we chose 13 plugins built by companies and the other 10 by individual
developers. For the second, we picked 10 with less than 20,000 downloads and the other 13 with
more than 20,000 downloads. Note that plugins with less downloads were not always those created
by individual developers. e plugins were chosen to have also diverse characteristics with regard
to the number of les and lines of code (LoC). Although plugins are oen believed to be small, in a
few cases they had more than 200 les and 100,000 LoC (see Table 7).
WordPress oers a set of functions to sanitize and validate the data types, to read entry points,
and to handle SQL commands ($wpdb class), which are invoked by some of the plugins. erefore,
we congured DEKANT with information about these functions, mapping them to the ISL tokens.
Recall that ISL abstracts the PHP instructions, enabling certain behaviors to be captured like
sanitization.
DEKANT extracts 345 slices from the plugins that begin at an entry point and end at a sensitive
sink. Next, it translates them into ISL and executes the detection procedure. In total 220 slices
are reported as potentially being vulnerable, but 5 of them are actually invalid alarms (i.e., false
positives (FP)). ere are 62 new vulnerabilities that no one had previously found, and 153 bugs that
had already been published by other researchers (Table 4). e remaining slices, a group of 125, are
correctly perceived as not vulnerable. e aws belong to six classes of vulnerability, ranging from
SQLI to CS (columns 3-8).
e zero-day vulnerabilities appear in 21 plugins: 11 developed by companies and 10 by individual
programmers; and 11 having more than 20,000 downloads. e most vulnerable plugin is the one
that has more les, while the plugins appearing in the next places are smaller, and the largest
plugin in terms of LoC has less than 4 identied bugs. ese results reveal that, independently of
the development teams, number of downloads, les, and LoC, several of the WordPress plugins
used in the wild are insecure.
e new aws were reported to the developers, and in some cases they have already been
acknowledged and xed, resulting in the release of updated versions of the plugins4. Overall, these
experiments are encouraging because the approach demonstrated the potential for the discovery of
many classes of vulnerabilities in several open-source plugins, some of them with considerable
user bases.
4For example, plugins appointment-booking-calendar 1.1.7, easy2map 1.2.9, payment-form-for-paypal-pro 1.0.1, resads 1.0.1
and simple-support-ticket-system 1.2 were xed thanks to this work.
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9.1.2 Real Web Applications. To determine if DEKANT is eective at classifying the vulnerabili-
ties belonging to the twelve classes under study, we run the tool with 23 well known vulnerable
open source soware packages divided into two sets.
e rst set is composed of 13 applications with more than 4,000 les and almost 1 million LoC
(Table 5). A few of the packages are large, such as Play sms and Clip Bucket, with approximately
250 and 150 thousand LoC. ere are 727 slices evaluated in this experiment, which were classied
manually to enable the validation of the outcomes of DEKANT. Table 5, in columns 6-9, displays the
results of this eort, where Vul stands for vulnerable slices, San for sanitized, and VC for validated
and/or changed.
DEKANT takes a short time to perform the analysis, in the order of tens of seconds (column
5). Columns 10-13 show that the tool correctly classies 503 slices as being vulnerable (Vul), 14
slices are wrongly labeled as having bugs (FPs) and 4 have errors that remain undetected (i.e., false
negatives (FN)). Columns 14-21 present how the 503 slices are sorted out into the twelve classes of
vulnerabilities (column Files aggregates three classes). Misclassication (FPs and FNs) is mainly
explained by the presence of validation and string modication functions with context-sensitive
states. In particular, most FPs belong to the class PHPCI, a type of vulnerability related to the
execution of preg match and preg replace functions (the remaining were in classes HI and XSS).
e FNs are also associated with PHPCI bugs.
Summing-up, the results are reassuring as DEKANT correctly classies every vulnerability that
was described in [18], but actually with less FP. e accuracy and precision are very high, around
0.97, and the FP rate is 0.06 and the FN rate is 0.01.
For the second set, we run DEKANT with ten applications with aws previously registered in
the CVE [5] and NVD [21] databases (Table 6). In total more than 4,200 les and 1.5 million LoC
are analyzed. e largest packages are epesi and phpMyAdmin, with approximately 750 and 250
thousand LoC. Similarly to the rst set of applications, we extracted 310 slices, which were then
checked manually.
DEKANT classies 223 slices as having bugs but 12 alarms are invalid (columns 5-6). e
vulnerabilities pertain to six classes, where the most common are SQLI and XSS (columns 7-10, with
Files aggregating DT, RFI and LFI). e FPs occur in the XSS and PHPCI classes due to equivalent
reasons as above. e remaining 87 slices are correctly set as not-vulnerable (not shown in the
table). Consequently, we could not nd missed bugs (i.e., FN is zero).
Overall, DEKANT had accuracy and precision of 0.96 and 0.95, and a FP rate of 0.12 (and no FNs).
ese results are very similar to the ones of the rst set, demonstrating that the tool is capable of
detecting vulnerabilities and of classifying them correctly independently of their classes.
Table 6. Slices in open source soware with vulnerabilities disclosed in the past, analyzed by DEKANT.
Web application Files LoC Time Classif. Vulnerability classes
(s) Vul FP SQLI Files* CI** XSS
cacti-0.8.8b 249 95274 7 2 2 1 1
communityEdition 228 217195 21 16 4 4 3 5
epesi-1.6.0 2246 741440 90 25 4 3 22
NeoBill0.9-alpha 620 100139 5 19 2 17
phpMyAdmin-4.2.6 538 241505 12 1 1
rease-0.9.6 171 109600 8 5 6 5
Schoolmate-1.5.4 64 8411 2 120 69 51
VideosTube 39 3458 2 1 1
Webchess 1.0 37 7704 2 20 6 14
Zero-CMS.1.0 21 1139 2 2 1 1
Total 4213 1525865 151 211 12 80 9 4 118
*DT & RFI, LFI vulnerabilities **PHPCI vulnerability
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Table 7. Vulnerability discovery results with WordPress plugins for DEKANT, WAPe, and phpSAFE.
Plugin Version Files LoC DEKANT WAPe phpSAFESQLI XSS FP FN SQLI XSS FPP FP FN SQLI XSS FP PFP FN
Appointment Booking Calendar 1.1.7 6 2955 3 4 1 3 1 3 3 4 2 14
Login by Auth0 1.3.6 35 3101 1 1 1
Authorizer 2.3.6 164 159023 2 2 1 1
BuddyPress 2.4.0 574 219690 1 – – – – –
Contact formgenerator 2.0.1 42 9187 11 11 3 11
CP Appointment Calendar 1.1.7 7 988 2 2 2 9
Easy2map 1.2.9 16 3193 1 1 1 8 10
Ecwid Shopping Cart 3.4.6 61 16807 1 1 – – – – 1
Gantry Framework 4.1.6 274 50717 3 1 2 1 2
Google Maps Travel Route 1.3.1 10 1692 1 2 1 1 2 1 7 10 2
Lightbox Plus Colorbox 2.7.2 13 5902 8 6 2 – – – – 8
Payment form for Paypal pro 1.0.1 10 3920 2 2 2 19 2
Recipes writer 1.0.4 9 2074 4 4 4 5
ResAds 1.0.1 30 3168 17 2 15 17
Simple support ticket system 1.2 20 1533 18 18 3 2 7 15
e Cart Press eCommerce Shopping 1.4.7 220 47114 8 17 8 17 – – – – 25
WebKite 2.0.1 13 1267 1 1 1
WP Easy Cart eCommerce Shopping 3.2.3 623 126448 13 6 13 6 – – – – 19
WP Marketplace 2.4.1 88 15485 2 24 3 3 9 1 20 2 27 18 30
WP Shop 3.5.3 49 9171 7 10 5 1 12 7 10 5 29
WP ToolBar Removal Node 1839 2 544 1 1 1
WP ultimate recipe 2.5 284 42774 1 1 1 1 6 1
WP Web Scraper 3.5 89 8116 3 3 – – – – 3
Total 2639 734869 66 106 5 4 55 67 3 2 54 17 70 84 102 89
9.2 Comparison with Plugin Analysis Tools
e section tests plugin analysis tools, namely WAPe [18] and phpSAFE [20], and compares them
to DEKANT. e two tools implement taint analysis in a diverse manner, but still with the aim of
tracking data that ows from the entry points to the sensitive sinks. WAPe is an extension of WAP,
and since it is highly congurable, we could set it up with the same knowledge about WordPress
functions as DEKANT. phpSAFE only looks for SQLI and XSS vulnerabilities in WordPress plugins.
erefore, to make the comparison among tools fair, we decided to consider only these two classes
in the evaluation, and accounted the slices with other bugs as not vulnerable. e experiments
are based on the 23 plugins previously presented, which have a total of 349 slices (the 345 slices
of Section 9.1.1 plus 4 extra slices that were extracted by the other two tools). e results are
summarized in Table 7.
DEKANT evaluates 345 slices (columns 5-8) and outputs 177 of them as potentially vulnerable to
SQLi and XSS. Out of this group, 172 of them have real bugs and 5 are FPs. e remaining 168 slices
are correctly classied as not vulnerable. While processing the results, we observed that: (i) there
are four vulnerabilities that only DEKANT is able to nd; (ii) a few slices with bugs are not collected
by DEKANT, which inevitably leads to FNs. is last observation conrms the fundamental role of
the slice extractor in these tools, as it gets the paths in code that end up being inspected.
WAPe discovers 122 bugs but misses 54 (columns 9 to 13). e tool includes a false positive
predictor, whose aim is to look at the results of taint analysis and exclude bug reports that are
potentially invalid — these are called false positives predicted (FPP). Aer analysis, three cases are
deemed FPP, leaving only two FPs. In the case of DEKANT, these ve slices are placed in the
non-vulnerable set. WAPe and DEKANT extract 126 slices in common, but there is one slice that
is only obtained by the former tool. is slice is correctly classied as vulnerable by WAPe (and
causes a FN in the other tools).
phpSAFE could only process 17 plugins (out of 23) and three of them partially (columns 14 to
18). For this reason, only 234 slices out of 349 are examined. Within the group of analyzed slices,
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there are 87 vulnerabilities that are found and 33 that are missed. However, phpSAFE nds three
errors that no other tool is able to discover. e 84 FPs are caused by the inclusion of sanitization
and input change functions in the slices, such as substr and preg replace from PHP and esc ar
and prepare from WordPress (the last one protects a SQL statement from SQLI aacks, providing
similar functionality as prepared statements).
phpSAFE scans 102 extra slices (aside from the 349 group), which are labeled as possible false
positives (PFP) in our evaluation. ese cases are associated with parts of the code where the results
of SQL queries are used in some sink (e.g., to embed database content in a web page returned to
a browser). e tool considers any of these results as malicious input, independently of the type
of query (e.g., an INSERT or UPDATE SQL command) and the sanitization of query’ parameters.
In addition, the tool does not seem to correlate these queries with the ones that insert data in the
database, and therefore it is dicult to conclude that these slices have any real problem. erefore,
due to this ambiguity, we keep these slices separate from the rest.
Table 8. Evaluation metrics of DEKANT, WAPe, phpSAFE, PhpMinerII, RIPS, and Pixy for the detection of
SQLI and XSS.
Metric Plugins WebApps – Data mining WebApps – Taint analysisDEKANT WAPe phpSAFE DEKANT WAPe PhpMiner II DEKANT RIPS Pixy
acc 0.97 0.84 0.50 0.97 0.96 0.83 0.97 0.80 0.54
pr 0.97 0.98 0.51 0.98 0.96 0.57 0.98 0.43 0.23
fpr 0.03 0.01 0.49 0.004 0.01 0.04 0.004 0.09 0.48
fnr 0.02 0.31 0.51 0.14 0.15 0.74 0.14 0.69 0.37
acc: accuracy; pr: precision; fpr: false positive rate; fnr: false negative rate
Table 8 has the metrics results for the three tools (columns 2-4). DEKANT is superior with the
highest combined accuracy and precision and low FP and FN rates. WAPe is second, being the tool
with the lowest FP rate and the second highest FN rate. phpSAFE has the worst performance, with
signicantly lower accuracy and precision. Notice that the 102 PFPs of phpSAFE are disregarded
from the calculations.
Table 9. Comparison of results between DEKANT, WAPe, PhpMinerII, RIPS and Pixy with open source
projects.
Web application DEKANT WAPe PhpMinerII RIPS PixySQLI XSS oth FP FN SQLI XSS oth FPP FP FN SQLI XSS FP FN SQLI XSS oth FP FN SQLI XSS FP FN
Admin Control Panel Lite 2 9 72 1 9 72 8 1 9 23 1 49 9 7 7 65 9 67 12 5
Clip Bucket 10 12 3 9 10 12 2 4 9 19 20 – – – – 31 19 47
Clip Bucket 4 10 12 3 9 4 10 12 2 4 9 3 19 17 1 – – – – 35 3 19 47 1
Ldap address book 39 1 3 36 1 2 6 39 1 4 5 38 39
Minutes 9 1 9 6 1 12 5 7 11 7 3 10 9 7 55 9
Mle Moodle 5 1 14 5 1 3 14 10 27 8 6 2 7 12 18 621
Php Open Chat 10 1 7 9 1 8 9 7 8 17 43 1 2 26 15
Pivotx 1 3 10 1 3 9 10 4 1 6 6 4 7 4 4 16 6
Play sms 5 7 5 2 7 10 12 6 2 31 4 10 20
RCR AEsir 9 4 9 4 1 3 6 8 4 2 1 2 7
SAE 61 65 22 5 61 65 20 10 2 8 2 118 2 5 141 65 178 61
Tomahawk Mail 2 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 6 1 1 1 2
vfront 32 68 34 2 11 32 68 34 24 2 11 1 105 74 39 114 32 70 6 36
Total 117 295 91 14 79 114 291 89 54 23 88 12 112 95 353 9 136 63 232 374 12 289 1031 181
9.3 Comparison with Data Mining Tools
A few other tools have implemented data mining mechanisms for tasks related with bug discovery,
namely WAPe and PhpMinerII [28, 29]. WAPe and PhpMinerII classify slices by resorting to data
mining with standard classiers, which do not consider order. WAPe obtains the slices with taint
analysis and then predicts if they are FPs or TPs with the classiers, with the aim of reducing
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
Statically Detecting Vulnerabilities by Processing Programming Languages as Natural Languages1:27
the alerts that are generated by mistake. PhpMinerII uses data mining to nd out if slices hold
aributes that make them look vulnerable, without specic concerns about false positives. is
tool handles only SQLI and reected XSS vulnerabilities.
Since PhpMinerII is not congurable with information about WordPress, and consequently it
would perform much worse with plugins, we opted to experiment with the rst set of 13 application
packages. Similarly, the same limitation applies to the vulnerability detection tools that will be
studied in the next section, and so we will focus on these applications for the rest of the evaluations.
We observed that the various tools (from this and next section) survey dierent groups of slices
because of their specic implementation of the slice extractor. erefore, we decided to create a
superset with all slices that could be captured based on the outputs of the tools, which contains
2609 slices. is set was then manually examined to determine which slices are vulnerable, and
it serves as a ground truth. Overall there are 582 slices with vulnerabilities (117 SQLI, 360 XSS,
and 105 others) and 2027 slices without problems. is second group was divided in a few subsets,
namely, slices with sanitized input, slices with validated or modied input, and slices without
external sources (i.e., without entry points) but with a sensitive sink. is last group was provided
by PhpMinerII and we designate it as the no-source subset.
9.3.1 All Vulnerability Classes. A summary of the experimental results is included in Table 9.
e vulnerabilities are distributed by classes SQLI, XSS and others, to facilitate the assessment
of alternative tools that only address specic bugs (like PhpMinerII). Columns 2 to 6 are about
DEKANT, displaying a total of 503 identied bugs. Notice that there are 75 more FNs than in
Table 5 because now we are covering a larger number of slices, some of which are not extracted by
DEKANT. e next six columns display WAPe’s results. WAPe reports less vulnerabilities and a
few more FPs and FNs.
With regard to false positives, DEKANT judges correctly as not vulnerable the 71 validated
and/or changed slices (i.e., column VC in Table 5) but WAPe just predicts 48 of them as FPP. Even
though WAPe handles a considerable number of symptoms to reduce mistakes, there is a lack of
aribute relation verication that induces erroneous decisions — the tool only checks if aributes
exist in a slice but does not have a way to relate them.
e dierence in false negatives between the tools is also explained by the same reason, plus the
importance of considering the order of the code elements in the slice. In particular, a misclassication
can occur when there is a concatenation of tainted with untainted variables (i.e., which were
validated or modied); this causes the data mining classier to nd symptoms related with validation
and outputs the slices as FPs. DEKANT implements a sequence model that takes into account how
the code elements appear in the slice, prevailing in these situations.
Table 10 sums up de evaluation, combining the confusion matrix and metrics. e results are
encouraging with DEKANT performing beer than WAPe, namely because it shows superior FP
and FN rates.
9.3.2 Just SQLI and XSS. is subsection only considers SQLI and reected XSS for a fair
comparison with PhpMinerII. PhpMinerII does not come trained when downloaded, and so we
Table 10. Confusion matrix of DEKANT, WAPe and RIPS for the detection of all vulnerability classes.
Observed Metric DEKANT WAPe RIPS
DEKANT WAPe RIPS acc 0.96 0.96 0.77
Predicted Vul N-Vul Vul N-Vul Vul N-Vul pr 0.97 0.96 0.47
Vul 503 14 494 23 208 232 fpr 0.007 0.01 0.11
N-Vul 79 2013 88 2004 374 1795 fnr 0.13 0.15 0.64
acc: accuracy; pr: precision; fpr: false positive rate; fnr: false negative rate
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had to build a dataset for that purpose. e training dataset was constructed by recreating the
procedure explained in [28, 29], where the WEKA package implemented the data mining tasks [40].
e same classiers were evaluated to select the best. Overall, the C4.5/J48 classier was chosen,
with an accuracy and precision close to 0.92.
Table 9 has the results for PhpMinerII. e tool obtains 1052 slices, where 219 are reported as
vulnerable and 833 as not-vulnerable. Manually, we inspected these slices and found out that only
604 were correctly labeled, 124 as vulnerable and 480 as not-vulnerable. Consequently, the tool
generates 95 FP and 353 FN. is notable misclassication is explained by various factors, such
as missing validations and string modications of inputs, and not taking into account the order
of code elements. In addition, some of the slides belong to the no-source subset and they lead
necessarily to invalid alarms (as there is no entry point to be maliciously exploited).
DEKANT outputs 412 vulnerabilities and 8 incorrect reports (out of the 14 shown in table). It also
misses 65 slices with bugs (out of the 79 shown in table). WAPe classies 405 vulnerabilities, but
with 16 FPs (of the 23 presented in table) and 72 FNs (out of the 88). Only 82 of the 124 identied
bugs by PhpMinerII are also agged as being vulnerable by DEKANT and WAPe. is means that
the 42 remaining vulnerable slices justify the increase of FN in the two tools.
Table 8 displays the calculated metrics when only SQLI and XSS are contemplated. DEKANT
and WAPe surpass PhpMinerII, exhibiting higher quality values for all metrics. Both DEKANT and
WAPe have an excellent accuracy and precision, but the former is superior with 0.97 and 0.98 on
the metrics. In addition, DEKANT has beer rates for false positives and false negatives.
9.4 Comparison with Taint Analysis Tools
ere have been tools proposed in the past that perform taint analysis to locate vulnerabilities, and
two notable examples are RIPS [6] and Pixy [12]. ey track data arriving at the entry points to
determine if it reaches a sensitive sink, taking sanitization operations in consideration. RIPS detects
the same classes of vulnerabilities as DEKANT, but Pixy only looks for SQLI and reected XSS. Our
evaluation compares the three tools while processing the same applications of the previous section
(i.e., the dataset with 2609 slices), with results being displayed in Table 9.
9.4.1 All Vulnerability Classes. e RIPS tool only outputs information about slices that are
regarded as vulnerable. erefore, when no result appears for a particular slice, this could occur
because the slice was considered valid or due to the inability to extract the slice. Since we are
unable to separate the two situations, this brings some level of uncertainty to the analysis.
RIPS generates alerts for a total of 440 slices in 11 applications (of the 13). Out of this group,
208 correspond to slices with real bugs and the remaining 232 to false alerts. ese FPs occur
essentially in slices with functions that change the data received at the entry points (such as, substr
and preg replace) or in slices with validation functions. is demonstrates the importance of the
identication of false positive symptoms and of evaluating the slices taking into consideration
the order of code elements (like DEKANT does). RIPS does not catch 374 vulnerabilities from the
ground truth. We speculate that the reason for this high number of FNs is probably related to the
extractor being unable to gather many slices.
Table 10 has the confusion matrix and the metrics. RIPS is outperformed by both DEKANT and
WAPe in the dataset with all classes of aws. Its accuracy and precision are 0.77 and 0.47, which
are not as high as the other tools.
9.4.2 Just SQLI and XSS. Pixy only searches for SQLI and XSS vulnerabilities. erefore, our
evaluation just covers these two classes (meaning that the 105 slices with other vulnerabilities are
treated as being true negatives).
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
Statically Detecting Vulnerabilities by Processing Programming Languages as Natural Languages1:29
Pixy results are displayed in the last four columns of Table 9. e tool raises 1332 alerts, but
the majority of them are mistakes5. Only 301 reported vulnerabilities are real (12 SQLI and 289
XSS). ere are 176 undetected bugs. Curiously, Pixy has around half the FNs of RIPS, and for some
applications it is the tool that detects more XSS vulnerabilities (e.g., the Minutes application) but at
the cost of a high FP rate. Section 9.3.2 presents the details about the DEKANT evaluation for SQLI
and XSS bugs. In what concerns RIPS, the tool nds 145 buggy slices but misses 328 (out of the 374
in the table). It also wrongly reports 192 slices as being vulnerable (of the 232 in the table).
Table 8 presents the metrics for these tools. e results corroborate the promising detection
capabilities of DEKANT, as the tool has the best accuracy and precision and the lowest FP and FN
rates. RIPS is second, but with an accuracy and precision reasonably below. For our dataset, the
weakest values are obtained by Pixy, with a small precision due to the many FP.
10 CONCLUSION
e paper explores a new approach to detect web application vulnerabilities inspired in NLP in which
static analysis tools learn to detect vulnerabilities automatically using machine learning. Whereas
in classical static analysis tools it is necessary to code knowledge about how each vulnerability is
detected, our approach obtains knowledge about vulnerabilities automatically. e approach uses a
sequence model (HMM) that, rst, learns to characterize vulnerabilities from a corpus composed
of sequences of observations annotated as vulnerable or not, then processes new sequences of
observations based on this knowledge, taking into consideration the order in which the observations
appear. e model can be used as a static analysis tool to discover vulnerabilities in source code
and identify their location.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
is work was partially supported by the national funds through Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia e a
Tecnologia (FCT)/MCTES (PIDDAC)/FEDER with reference to project AAC-2/SAICT/2017-029058
(SEAL), and through FCT with references UID/CEC/00408/2019 (LASIGE) and UID/CEC/50021/2019
(INESC-ID).
REFERENCES
[1] Erik Arisholm, Lionel C Briand, and Eivind B Johannessen. 2010. A systematic and comprehensive investigation of
methods to build and evaluate fault prediction models. Journal of Systems and Soware 83, 1 (2010), 2–17.
[2] Michael Backes, Konrad Rieck, Malte Skoruppa, Ben Stock, and Fabian Yamaguchi. 2017. Ecient and Flexible
Discovery of PHP Application Vulnerabilities. In EuroS&P. 334–349.
[3] Leonard E. Baum and Ted Petrie. 1966. Statistical Inference for Probabilistic Functions of Finite State Markov Chains.
e Annals of Mathematical Statistics 37, 6 (1966), 1554–1563.
[4] BBC Technology. 2014. Millions of websites hit by Drupal hack aack. hp://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
29846539.
[5] CVE. [n. d.]. hp://cve.mitre.org.
[6] Johannes Dahse and orsten Holz. 2014. Simulation of Built-in PHP Features for Precise Static Code Analysis. In
Proceedings of the 21st Network and Distributed System Security Symposium.
[7] Johannes Dahse and orsten Holz. 2015. Experience Report: An Empirical Study of PHP Security Mechanism Usage.
In Proceedings of the 2015 International Symposium on Soware Testing and Analysis. 60–70.
[8] Janez Demsˇar. 2006. Statistical Comparisons of Classiers over Multiple Data Sets. e Journal of Machine Learning
Research 7 (Dec 2006), 1–30.
[9] Jose´ Fonseca and Marco Vieira. 2014. A Practical Experience on the Impact of Plugins in Web Security. In Proceedings
of the 33rd IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems. 21–30.
[10] HELPNETSECURITY. 2017. Hacker breached 60+ unis, govt agencies via SQL injection.
hps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2017/02/16/hacker-govt-agencies-via-sql-injection/.
5In fact, a signicant number of non-vulnerable slices included in our ground truth dataset comes from Pixy.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
1:30 Medeiros, et al.
[11] Imperva. 2017. e State of Web Application Vulnerabilities in 2017. (Dec. 2017).
[12] N. Jovanovic, C. Kruegel, and E. Kirda. 2006. Precise alias analysis for static detection of web application vulnerabilities.
In Proceedings of the 2006 Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security. 27–36.
[13] Daniel Jurafsky and James H. Martin. 2008. Speech and Language Processing. Prentice Hall.
[14] Stefan Lessmann, Bart Baesens, Christophe Mues, and Swantje Pietsch. 2008. Benchmarking classication models for
soware defect prediction: A proposed framework and novel ndings. IEEE Transactions on Soware Engineering 34, 4
(2008), 485–496.
[15] Zhen Li, Deqing Zou, Shouhuai Xu, Xinyu Ou, Hai Jin, Sujuan Wang, Zhijun Deng, and Yuyi Zhong. 2018. VulDeePecker:
A Deep Learning-Based System for Vulnerability Detection. In Annual Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium.
[16] Ibe´ria Medeiros, Nuno F. Neves, and Miguel Correia. 2016. DEKANT: a static analysis tool that learns to detect web
application vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the 25th International Symposium on Soware Testing and Analysis.
[17] Ibe´ria Medeiros, Nuno F. Neves, and Miguel Correia. 2016. Detecting and Removing Web Application Vulnerabilities
with Static Analysis and Data Mining. IEEE Transactions on Reliability 65, 1 (March 2016), 54–69.
[18] Ibe´ria Medeiros, Nuno F. Neves, and Miguel Correia. 2016. Equipping WAP with Weapons to Detect Vulnerabilities. In
Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks.
[19] Stephan Neuhaus, omas Zimmermann, Christian Holler, and Andreas Zeller. 2007. Predicting vulnerable soware
components. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 529–540.
[20] Paulo Nunes, Jose´ Fonseca, and Marco Vieira. 2015. phpSAFE: A Security Analysis Tool for OOP Web Application
Plugins. In Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks.
[21] NVD. [n. d.]. hp://nvd.nist.org.
[22] Henning Perl, Sergej Dechand, Mahew Smith, Daniel Arp, Fabian Yamaguchi, Konrad Rieck, Sascha Fahl, and Yasemin
Acar. 2015. VCCFinder: Finding Potential Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Projects to Assist Code Audits. In Proceedings
of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’15). 426–437.
[23] Lawrence R Rabiner. 1989. A tutorial on hidden Markov models and selected applications in speech recognition. Proc.
IEEE 77, 2 (1989), 257–286.
[24] S. Rasthofer, S. Arzt, and E. Bodden. 2014. A Machine-learning Approach for Classifying and Categorizing Android
Sources and Sinks. In Proceedings of the 2014 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS).
[25] Rebecca L. Russell, Louis Y. Kim, Lei H. Hamilton, Tomo Lazovich, Jacob A. Harer, Onur Ozdemir, Paul M. Ellingwood,
and Marc W. McConley. 2018. Automated Vulnerability Detection in Source Code Using Deep Representation Learning.
In Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning and Application (ICMLA).
[26] R. Scandariato, J. Walden, A. Hovsepyan, and W. Joosen. 2014. Predicting Vulnerable Soware Components via Text
Mining. IEEE Transactions on Soware Engineering 40, 10 (2014), 993–1006.
[27] Umesh Shankar, Kunal Talwar, Jerey S Foster, and David Wagner. 2001. Detecting format-string vulnerabilities with
type qualiers. In Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Security Symposium.
[28] Lwin Khin Shar and Hee Beng Kuan Tan. 2012. Mining input sanitization paerns for predicting SQL injection
and cross site scripting vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Soware Engineering.
1293–1296.
[29] Lwin Khin Shar and Hee Beng Kuan Tan. 2012. Predicting common web application vulnerabilities from input
validation and sanitization code paerns. In Proceedings of the 27th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated
Soware Engineering. 310–313.
[30] Lwin Khin Shar, Hee Beng Kuan Tan, and Lionel C. Briand. 2013. Mining SQL Injection and Cross Site Scripting Vul-
nerabilities using Hybrid Program Analysis. In Proceedings of the 35th International Conference on Soware Engineering.
642–651.
[31] Sink. 2017. XSS Aacks: e Next Wave. hps://snyk.io/blog/xss-aacks-the-next-wave/.
[32] Noah A. Smith. 2011. Linguistic Structure Prediction. Graeme Hirst.
[33] Sooel Son and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2011. SAFERPHP: Finding Semantic Vulnerabilities in PHP Applications. In Proceedings
of the ACM SIGPLAN 6th Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security.
[34] e Hacker News. 2017. It’s 3 Billion! Yes, Every Single Yahoo Account Was Hacked In 2013 Data Breach.
hps://thehackernews.com/2017/10/yahoo-email-hacked.html.
[35] e Hacker News. 2017. WordPress Plugin Used by 300,000+ Sites Found Vulnerable to SQL Injection Aack.
hps://thehackernews.com/2017/06/wordpress-hacking-sql-injection.html.
[36] threatpost. 2017. Million-Plus WordPress Sites Exposed by Vulnerable Plugin. hps://threatpost.com/million-plus-
wordpress-sites-exposed-by-vulnerable-plugin/123983/.
[37] A. Viterbi. 1967. Error Bounds for Convolutional Codes and an Asymptotically Optimum Decoding Algorithm. IEEE
Transactions on Information eory 13, 2 (April 1967), 260–269.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
Statically Detecting Vulnerabilities by Processing Programming Languages as Natural Languages1:31
[38] James Walden, Maureen Doyle, Grant A Welch, and Michael Whelan. 2009. Security of open source web applications.
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Empirical Soware Engineering and Measurement. 545–553.
[39] J. Williams and D. Wichers. 2017. OWASP Top 10 2017 – e Ten Most Critical Web Application Security Risks.
[40] Ian H. Wien, Eibe Frank, and Mark A. Hall. 2011. Data Mining: Practical Machine Learning Tools and Techniques (3rd
ed.). Morgan Kaufmann.
[41] WordPress. [n. d.]. hps://wordpress.org/.
[42] F. Yamaguchi, N. Golde, D. Arp, and K. Rieck. 2014. Modeling and Discovering Vulnerabilities with Code Property
Graphs. In Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 590–604.
[43] F. Yamaguchi, A. Maier, H. Gascon, and K. Rieck. 2015. Automatic Inference of Search Paerns for Taint-Style
Vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 797–812.
[44] F. Yamaguchi, C. Wressnegger, H. Gascon, and K. Rieck. 2013. Chucky: Exposing Missing Checks in Source Code for
Vulnerability Discovery. In Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer Communications Security.
499–510.
Ibe´ria Medeiros is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Informatics, at the Faculty of
Sciences of University of Lisbon. She is a member of the Large-Scale Informatics Systems
(LASIGE) Laboratory, and the Navigators research group. She holds a PhD in Computer
Science by the Faculty of Sciences of University of Lisbon. Currently, she is the principal
investigator of the SEAL national project, has been participating in DiSIEM European
project and REDBOOK national project, and participate in SEGRID European project. She
is author of tools for soware security, which WAP (Web Application Protection) is the
most known and an OWASP project. Her research interests are concerned with soware
security, source code static analysis, vulnerability detection, data mining and machine
learning, and security. More information about her at hp://www.di.fc.ul.pt/∼imedeiros/.
Nuno Neves is Professor at the Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Sciences of the
University of Lisboa. He leads the Navigators research group and he is on the scientic board
of the LASIGE research unit. His main research interests are in security and dependability
aspects of distributed systems. Currently, he is investigator in several national and EU
projects, such as SEAL and uPVN. His work has been recognized in several occasions,
for example with the IBM Scientic Prize and the William C. Carter award. He is on the
editorial board of the International Journal of Critical Computer-Based Systems. More
information about him can be found at hp://www.di.fc.ul.pt/∼nuno/.
Miguel Correia is an Associate Professor with Habilitation at Instituto Superior Te´cnico (IST)
of Universidade de Lisboa (ULisboa), and a Senior Researcher at INESC-ID in the Dis-
tributed Systems Group (GSD). He has been involved in several international and na-
tional research projects related to cybersecurity, including the SPARTA, aliChain, Safe-
Cloud, PCAS, TCLOUDS, ReSIST, CRUTIAL, and MAFTIA European projects. He has more
than 150 publications and is Senior Member of the IEEE. More information about him at
hp://www.gsd.inesc-id.pt/∼mpc/.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
